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Abstract:  The concept of identity was introduced into the neoclassical utility maximising 
framework by Akerlof and Kranton in an analysis which draws directly from social 
psychology's social identity approach and self-categorisation theory. This paper examines 
their analysis, and compares the social identity approach and an alternative social 
psychology identity framework called the sociological approach to identity. Using this 
comparison, the paper argues that their treating identity as an argument in the utility 
function leaves unaddressed how individuals' different social identities are related. The 
paper suggests a framework for addressing this issue by embedding their utility function in 
a personal identity objective function. The general context for the paper is the Akerlof–
Kranton analysis as an example of ‘recent economics’ defined as a collection of new 
competing research programmes that make departures from neoclassical economics. 
Keywords: Identity in economics, Social identity approach, Sociological approach to 
identity, Personal identity objection function, Recent economics 
1 Introduction 
The concept of identity has been extensively investigated in psychology and 
sociology since the 1970s but, with a few exceptions, has only recently begun to 
receive serious attention in economics.1 The ‘Economics and Identity’ paper of 
George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2000) represents an important contribution in 
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this regard in that it systematically introduces the concept of identity into the 
standard neoclassical framework by incorporating identity as an argument in the 
utility function. As such, the paper is characteristic of what I have termed ‘recent 
economics’, understood as a collection of new research programmes emerging in 
the last two decades, all of which have relied on significant imports of non-
economics science content to produce new arguments in economics (Davis, 2006). 
Akerlof and Kranton explicitly characterise their own analysis as one offering 
explanatory advantages by virtue of its drawing upon science content outside 
economics: 
Because of its explanatory power, numerous scholars in psychology, 
sociology, political science, anthropology, and history have adopted identity as a 
central concept. This paper shows how identity can be brought into economic 
analysis, allowing a new view of many economic problems. (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000, p. 716) 
By incorporating identity in standard utility function analysis, however, 
Akerlof and Kranton also differ from many of the new research strategies in ‘recent 
economics’ whose imports from other fields have produced significant departures 
from the standard neoclassical programme. Given the breadth and diversity of the 
investigation of identity and self concepts in psychology and sociology in recent 
years, this naturally raises the question as to the extent to which their imported 
contents reflect these fields versus the extent to which they reflect the limited 
opportunities available for introducing the concept of identity into neoclassical 
economics. I previously argued that neoclassical economics lacks an adequate 
account of the identity of the individual, because the utility function analysis lacks 
the resources to explain the individuation and re-identification of individuals (Davis, 
2003). Thus a further question the Akerlof–Kranton borrowing of social psychology 
identity concepts raises is whether their treatment of identity rescues the standard 
neoclassical view of the individual. 
In order to investigate these questions, I begin in the second section by 
briefly describing the main identity concepts which Akerlof and Kranton draw from 
psychology. In the third section, I explain how they use these concepts by 
describing their formal model, which treats identity as an argument in a standard 
utility function. In the fourth section, I describe the particular approach to identity 
in psychology on which they draw—social identity theory.2 In the fifth section, I 
describe a rival approach to identity from sociology which they do not employ—the 
sociological approach to identity.3 In the sixth section, I review the Akerlof–Kranton 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be accessed by following the 
link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
 
 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, No. 3 (May 2007): pg. 349-362. DOI. This article is © [Oxford University Press] and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. [Oxford University Press] does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from [Oxford University Press]. 
3 
 
 
framework in the context of differences between the two approaches to identity, 
and evaluate their concept of social identity in this light. The seventh section 
suggests an inversion of the Akerlof–Kranton framework that addresses the issue of 
how one can add an account of personal identity to their social identity analysis. 
The eighth section returns to the paper's opening theme to comment on the 
Akerlof–Kranton framework as an example of ‘recent economics’. 
2 The Akerlof–Kranton identity concept 
The identity approach which Akerlof and Kranton employ is constructed out 
of ideas from two different areas of theoretical investigation in psychology. First, 
the particular concept of identity they employ is a social identity concept 
understood from the individual's point of view as the person's ‘sense of self’ or ‘self-
image’. A person's self-image is multidimensional and is represented in terms of all 
the different social categories (ethnicity, gender, religion, etc.) assignable to the 
individual. Social categories are broad social science classifications used in 
academic research and by government agencies to describe widely recognised 
social aggregates. A person's ‘sense of self’ or ‘self-image’, then, is said to 
constitute his/her identity in the sense that, as Akerlof and Kranton put it, ‘identity 
is bound to social categories; and individuals identify with people in some 
categories and differentiate themselves from those in others’ (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000, p. 720; emphasis added). The idea of ‘identifying with’ others is what makes 
their concept of identity a social identity one. They are silent about the concept of 
personal identity or the idea of ‘identity apart from’ others. Note also that their 
particular view of social identity, namely that individuals identify with others in 
terms of social categories, is different from the idea that individuals identify with 
others through social structural phenomena such as groups, institutions and 
interpersonal relationships. 
Second, Akerlof and Kranton draw on the psychodynamic theory of 
personality to explain how an individual's identity as self-image relates to 
behaviour. 
This model can be expressed by ideas central to the psychodynamic theory of 
personality, found in almost any psychology text. In personality 
development, psychologists agree on the importance of internalisation of 
rules for behavior. Freud called this process the development of the 
superego. Modern scholars disagree with Freud on the importance of 
psychosexual factors in an individual's development, but they agree on the 
importance of anxiety that a person experiences when she violates her 
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internalised rules. One's identity, or ego, or self, must be constantly 
‘defended against anxiety in order to limit disruption and maintain a sense of 
unity’. (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, p. 728)4 
Social categories are associated with various rules of behaviour that 
individuals internalise in a process that constitutes the individual's identity or sense 
of self. When these internalised rules are violated (in ways that Akerlof and Kranton 
model in a game-theoretic setting), this generates a sense of anxiety on the part of 
the individual, leading to actions intended to reduce this anxiety, and thereby 
restore the individual's ‘sense of unity’. Alternatively, they allow that the violation 
of internalised rules of behaviour generates ‘cognitive dissonance’ with the same 
effects. 
Thus the concepts of ‘personality’, ‘ego’, ‘self’ and ‘sense of unity’ from the 
passage above are used in essentially the same way as the concepts of ‘sense of 
self’ and ‘self-image’ in that all refer to the identity of the individual understood in 
social identity terms. The former set of concepts, however, concern individual 
behavioural mechanisms, whereas the latter concepts concern the actual content of 
individual identity. That is, the individual's self-image has as its specific content all 
the different identifications with others which the individual has, while this self-
image functions by way of a psychological mechanism internal to the individual that 
produces the choices individuals make to reduce anxiety. Akerlof and Kranton 
suggest that this internal mechanism is inaccessible to individuals when saying that 
they use the verb ‘choose’ advisedly in their analysis, and ‘do not presume one way 
or another that people are aware of their own motivations, as in standard utility 
theory which is agnostic as to whether an individual shopper is aware or not of the 
reasons for her choices’ (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, p. 719). 
3 Identity or self-image as an argument in the utility 
function 
To model these concepts, Akerlof and Kranton incorporate identity in a 
standard utility function framework by treating identity or self-image as an 
argument in the utility function:  
 
Graphic (1) 
 
Here utility depends upon j's identity or self-image Ij and also on j's actions aj and 
the actions of others a–j. Identity or self-image itself is defined as:  
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Graphic (2) 
 
Identity or self-image depends again on j's actions and the actions of others, upon 
j's assignable social categories cj, upon j's own characteristics εj, and upon the 
extent to which j's own given characteristics match the social ideals of j's 
categories, as indicated by recognised social prescriptions P. 
This interpretation of self-image should not be confused with a meaning often 
associated with the idea of self-image, namely, the individual's image of the self per 
se or of the self as a whole. In the Akerlof–Kranton approach, the self as a whole is 
the utility function itself, and Ij does not depend on Uj, that is, identity does not 
depend on having a sense of the oneself as a whole, but rather Uj depends on Ij. 
Self-image, in this respect, reflects matching relationships between certain 
characteristics of the individual and the ideal characteristics of certain social 
categories and, as such, concerns an aspect (or collection of aspects) of the self 
rather than the self per se. Another way of putting this point is to say that, despite 
the ordinary meaning of the term, identity as self-image in the Akerlof–Kranton 
model is not reflexive. In a reflexive relationship the subject takes a stance toward 
the subject him/herself, or the subject makes the entire subject his/her object, but 
here the subject not only takes no such a stance, but self-image is determined in 
terms of third-party observable relationships between the individual and social 
characteristics. Thus Ij might better be labelled a social image of the self which the 
individual adopts rather than a self-image. 
From this perspective, the Akerlof–Kranton modelling strategy can be 
compared to the standard extended utility function time allocation modelling 
strategy of Gary Becker and others (Becker, 1996). In Becker's analysis, personal 
and social capital are stocks of non-commodity wealth inherited and further 
produced with time and market goods such that individuals maximise utility given 
these stocks. Thus, one's various social identities might be considered an 
individual's social capital, and their sense of self-image might be considered the 
individual's personal capital. Akerlof and Kranton do not use the language of capital 
and investment in their paper, but their self-image function (2) operates like a 
production function, albeit in their model in a strategic, game-theoretic setting in 
which others' choices influence individuals' own choices, and in terms of their 
psychodynamic theory of personality, according to which individuals work to reduce 
anxiety and cognitive dissonance. That is, individuals construct their personalities or 
self-images (but not themselves) by using social prescriptions P as inputs that tell 
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them how to match their own characteristics εj and their ideal characteristics 
according to the social categories cj assignable to them, all based on an internal 
technology of anxiety reduction. 
Akerlof and Kranton's analysis is also like Becker's treatment of personal 
capital in that, in their framework, individuals engaged in anxiety or cognitive 
dissonance reduction effectively act to offset depreciation in personal capital self-
image stocks. But Akerlof and Kranton's analysis differs in that there is no 
mechanism in their case for actions in which the individual would also invest in 
personality or self-image capital, as is the case in Becker's learning-by-doing 
analysis in which, for example, larger stocks of music appreciation capital increase 
the satisfaction from listening to music, which then feed back into additional 
investment in music appreciation capital and so on. Rather, the Akerlof–Kranton 
model is homeostatic in character, in that it employs a regulatory feedback principle 
that serves to maintain a given personality stock or self-image state of the 
individual, where the regulator on maintaining the level of this stock balances the 
state of the individual's ideal social characteristics and of his/her assignable social 
categories cj. 
4 Psychology's social identity approach 
As noted at the outset, of the variety of approaches to identity and the 
concept of the self in psychology and sociology, Akerlof and Kranton adopt what is 
known as the ‘social identity’ approach. The ‘social identity’ approach dates to the 
1970s and the work of Henri Tajfel, whose thinking largely continues to define the 
approach (cf., Abrams and Hogg, 1999). Tajfel defined social identity as ‘the 
individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some 
emotional and value significance to him of his group membership’ (Tajfel, 1972, p. 
292). Though a great deal has been published on social identity in the three 
decades since Tajfel's initial work, the framework continues to treat individuals' 
identity as their given social identity, as Tajfel did in terms of the different social 
categories into which individuals fall and to which they accordingly are seen as 
feeling they belong. The principal extension of the social identity approach today is 
‘self-categorisation theory’ developed by John Turner first in 1985, which elaborates 
a process whereby individuals come to see themselves in terms of certain social 
categories (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). Akerlof and Kranton follow this 
particular development in their explanation of social identity in terms of the 
individual's assignable categories. They depart modestly from the social identity 
literature in emphasising psychodynamic personality theory and the role of anxiety 
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in individual behaviour, neither of which figures per se as a theoretical construct for 
current proponents of the approach. However, the general motivational basis for 
explaining the self-categorisation processes in the social identity literature is not far 
removed. While the main emphasis in self-categorisation theory is upon cognitive 
processes and individuals' beliefs about themselves and social groups, there is also 
emphasis upon ‘uncertainty reduction’ as a core motivation, where this idea goes 
beyond an emphasis purely on cognitive behaviour (Hogg, 2001). Given, then, that 
Akerlof and Kranton use both anxiety reduction and cognitive dissonance reduction 
as mechanisms to explain behaviour, their recourse to psychodynamic personality 
theory seems not to add anything significantly different from what appears in the 
mainstream of psychology's current social identity theory. 
From the beginning, it should be noted, the social identity theory literature 
has largely set aside the difference between the concept of an individual's social 
identity (‘identifying with others’) and the concept of an individual's personal 
identity (‘identity apart from others’), though many contributors recognise the 
distinction. As the labels and descriptors imply, the former refers to commonalities 
between people within social categories as well as to differences between 
individuals in different social categories, whereas the latter refers to the self as 
being distinct from other people in general. According to Tajfel and others, the 
reason for their particular focus is that social identity theory originated in postwar 
European traditions in social psychology largely at odds with American ones, and in 
the view that social psychology explanations of collective phenomena are 
undermined when formulated in reductionist or individualist terms (Tajfel et al., 
1984).6 A consequence of this for social identity theory research is that contributors 
who do recognise differences in the two identity concepts have generally put aside 
attention to how individuals' social and personal identities might relate to one 
another, how they might mediate one another, and how personal identity itself 
might be understood, suggesting that the latter concept might better be dealt with 
by philosophers, for whom it has long been an important concern. Thus, effectively 
the only concept of the self which the social identity literature employs is that of the 
collective or social self, such that individuals are loosely seen to be collections of 
social identities. 
Not surprisingly, then, Turner's self-categorisation theory has as a central 
mechanism that people are ‘depersonalised’ in their adoption of social identities in 
that they come to see themselves as embodiments of group prototypes rather than 
as independent individuals. Turner does not take depersonalisation to imply, as 
might appear, that individuals are ‘dehumanised’ or ‘deindividuated’, meaning that 
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they are damaged or are have reduced well-being when identifying with others, but 
simply that they set aside their status as independent beings—as economists would 
say, ceteris paribus—when engaged in self-categorisation. One dimension of 
depersonalisation that deserves attention, however, concerns why and how any 
particular self-categorisation becomes psychologically ‘salient’ for an individual in 
the sense that the individual sees a given category as applying to him/herself (as 
well as the degree to which it is seen to apply). Clearly, individuals who have 
similar characteristics nonetheless differ in the extent to which they see themselves 
as members of certain groups. Why does one individual see him/herself as a 
member of some social group, while another with the same characteristics does 
not? The fact that like individuals can see themselves as members of the same 
social groups, but differ in how they give precedence to some groups over others, 
suggests that social identity does not exhaust individual identity, and that personal 
identity and social identity must be understood in relation to one another. In this 
respect, an important contribution is Tajfel's ‘accentuation effect’, whereby once it 
is given that individuals believe within some judgment dimension that a particular 
social category applies to them, they perceptually ‘accentuate’ both the similarities 
among stimuli falling within that social category and the differences between stimuli 
from that and other social categories (Tajfel, 1959). Tajfel developed his views with 
the aim of explaining such things as stereotyping, ethnocentrism, prejudice, and in-
group bias. Nonetheless, without a concept of personal identity, the main thrust of 
‘self-categorisation theory’ and the social identity approach is to explain the effects 
of social categories on individuals per se, and less to explain how those categories 
become salient for individuals in the first place. 
Finally, in its primary emphasis on cognitive processes, social identity theory, 
despite its name and apparent thrust, is a psychological theory, not a sociological 
one, as will become clearer in the next section when it is compared to the 
alternative sociological approach to identity with its primary emphasis on social 
relationships. Though the dividing lines within the field of social psychology on 
identity and self concepts between primarily psychological and sociological 
approaches are often blurred, and though the two types of approaches are 
complementary in important respects, there remain important differences between 
the two approaches that reflect their respective disciplinary origins.7 One difference 
that is particularly important here is that social identity theorists do not explain 
self-categorisation in terms of social structural interpersonal processes (whether 
between individuals or between individuals and groups of individuals), while this is 
the starting point for the sociological approach to identity. This is important 
because interpersonal processes presuppose some account of individual identity as 
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personal identity, since interpersonal interaction between individuals requires that 
they also be identified apart from or independently of their interaction, if we are to 
say who it is that is interacting. Thus, as will emerge in the next section, it is the 
sociological approach to identity, not psychology's social identity approach, which 
offers the outlines of an account of how social identity is related to personal 
identity. This difference will be seen to be important when we return to Akerlof and 
Kranton's reliance on psychology's social identity approach in accounting for 
identity in the utility function framework. 
5 The sociological approach to identity 
The central assumption of the sociological approach to self and identity is 
that there is an interactive reciprocal relation between the self and society in the 
sense that each influences the other. Individuals always act in social contexts and 
influence society through the groups, organisations and institutions, while society 
influences individuals through shared language meanings and other inherited social 
structures that enable individuals to interact, and take on social roles. Though the 
sociological approach has antecedents in the idea of the ‘looking glass self’ of 
Charles Cooley (1902) and the symbolic interactionist thinking of George Mead 
(1934), current work on identity generally follows the structural approach of 
Sheldon Stryker, which assumes, in contrast to Mead, that social structures—and 
thus the self and identity—are relatively stable (Stryker, 1980).8 The sociological 
approach to identity is thus different from the social identity approach for which 
social categories are social science classifications that subsume individuals under 
general designations whereas, in the sociological approach, social structure is 
conceptualised in terms of different types of social structural phenomena—
especially social groups—through which individuals interact. While individuals 
additionally recognise social categories as having social structural effects apart from 
their use in social science and indeed act with them in mind, social categories 
nonetheless constitute a relatively flat form of social structure by comparison with 
the multidimensional affiliations and associations individuals have with groups, 
organisations and institutions that themselves take on a variety of different forms, 
are hierarchically organised and have complex overlapping interconnections. One 
consequence of this, which is reflected in the sociological approach's central 
assumption that self and society are in interactive reciprocal relation to one 
another, is that individuals can be seen to have a status apart from how they are 
understood in social terms. Because there is such a vast variety of forms of social 
life, individuals cannot be explained in terms of their social characteristics alone, if 
they are to be seen as having any unity at all, and thus, metaphorically speaking, 
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individuals occupy an intersection or constitute something of a ‘common 
denominator’ to all these different social forms. Put in terms of identity analysis, 
individuals have personal identities as well social identities, and these two types of 
identities need to be seen as related. 
Thus contributors to the sociological approach argue that treating social 
categories and social groups as the same is misleading, both because doing so 
obscures the different features of different kinds of social groups, which have 
different types of internal dynamic structures with different within-group 
behavioural implications for individuals, and because different kinds of social groups 
fit into overall social structure differently. Social groups, moreover, are usually 
structured in terms of different roles that account for the cohesion of the group, 
and individuals accordingly also have different types of relationships to the same 
social groups depending on the roles they occupy in those groups (Stets and Burke, 
2000). A role identity is defined as ‘the character and the role that an individual 
devises for himself as an occupant of a particular social position’ (McCall and 
Simmons, 1978, p. 65). This combines the idea of pre-given social positions with 
their interpretation on the part of individuals. On the one hand, then, roles and 
positions are almost always subject to interpretation and negotiation while, on the 
other hand, individuals generally seek to match their own self-conceptions with the 
expectations others have of their roles. The negotiation of roles, however, also 
needs to be seen in the light of the overall structure of a set of roles within a social 
group. In the simplest setting, roles are paired with counter-roles (such as parent 
and child) while, in more complicated group and institutional settings (such as in 
business firms), roles are more highly differentiated, and have a variety of 
interconnections with one another. This all serves to remind us that people are 
individualised by their different relationships to social groups of which they are 
members. Accordingly, whereas psychology's social identity theory discussed above 
simply distinguishes between in-groups and out-groups, the sociological approach 
sees individuals as having multiple relations to others that cannot be collapsed 
along a single in/out axis. 
This naturally brings up the issue of individuals' multiple identities or multiple 
social identities. The social identity approach recognises that individuals have 
multiple identities, but offers little to explain their interconnection. According to 
social science systems of social category classification, populations in different 
categories may occupy certain locations, populations may change in size over time, 
populations may overlap or any of number of possible statistical judgements may 
be made of social categories aimed at recording population characteristics. In 
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contrast, the sociological approach to identity seeks to explain individuals' social 
identity as the product of individual action within a social structure in virtue of the 
ways that different individual roles and positions relate to social structures. 
Individuals' social identities, then, are not simply a collection of characteristics that 
individuals contingently possess, but presuppose some causal account of how they 
have come to occupy positions in a particular social structure. Multiple identities, 
however, still remain a problem in the sociological identity approach. Like the social 
identity approach, it employs the concept of salience to explain how individuals 
favour certain identities over others. The language of salience, however, seems less 
an explanation of how or why individuals favour certain identities, and more simply 
a widely accepted terminology used to explain the fact that people do seem to 
favour certain social identities. I return to this issue below. 
In any event, that individuals somehow favour certain identities is also 
central to the sociological approach to identity. The emphasis in the sociological 
approach, as suggested above, is on what individuals do as agents, how they 
actively negotiate their roles, and how their doing so creates their relationships with 
others. For example, in intragroup settings, individuals' self-conceptions reflect a 
sense of membership they set out to acquire for themselves, and activate for them 
what has been labelled a sense of ‘self-efficacy’ about what one does (Bandura, 
1977). Self-efficacy is defined as having beliefs about one's ability to ‘organize and 
execute the courses of action required to produce given attainments’ (Bandura, 
1997, p. 3), or as having beliefs about one's competencies and one's ability to 
exercise them (Mischel, 1973). Individuals are also thought to have a sense of self-
worth based on their relations to groups of which they are not members or groups 
to which they are outsiders. In such intergroup settings, individuals evaluate 
themselves favourably vis-à-vis outsiders as having a self-worth. In contrast to 
individuals' sense of self-efficacy, individuals' sense of self-worth appears to be 
more prey to contingencies beyond their control owing to events and circumstances 
that change the public standing of individuals' group characteristics (Crocker and 
Wolfe, 2001). But both self-efficacy and self-worth are still seen to be part of an 
individual's self-esteem, though the former appears more under the individual's 
own control, and thus casts the individual in a more active capacity. In any event, 
the sociological approach emphasises that individuals are agents. 
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6 Akerlof and Kranton and the two approaches to identity 
Psychology's social identity theory, we saw, is explicitly rooted in a European 
tradition in social psychology that assumes that social psychology explanations of 
collective phenomena ought not to be formulated reductionistically in terms of 
individual behaviour. Indeed, it is partly for this reason that social identity theorists 
understand individual identity almost exclusively in social terms and do not 
systematically employ any concept of personal identity. Moreover, they are able to 
do this because their focus is strictly an individual's psychological process of self-
categorisation per se rather than any process of negotiating social relationships, as 
in the sociological approach to identity. Does this foundational assumption, then, 
create problems for Akerlof and Kranton's adoption of the non-individualist social 
identity approach for their methodological individualist utility function account of 
individuals' social identity? 
This question needs to be considered in light of the fact that individuals have 
multiple social identifications. Both approaches to identity discussed in the last two 
sections assume that individuals' multiple social identities are ordered hierarchically 
according to a principle of salience, though neither explains just how such rankings 
actually come about or can change. In doing so, they make it possible, respectively, 
to ignore and not address the issue of how individuals' personal identities might 
function as means of organising individuals' multiple social identities. But if we take 
a more critical view of the matter, both approaches might rather be said to fail to 
explain social identification, because they lack an account of ‘who’ it is that has 
multiple social identities. That is, without some account of the ‘bearer’ of a set of 
social identities, saying that ‘an individual’ identifies with others is largely an empty 
claim. Indeed, without some account of the ‘bearer’ of a set of social identities the 
individual arguably fragments into a collection of unconnected social identities. 
Note, then, that while Akerlof and Kranton also refer to the concept of 
salience, this concept plays a minor role in their analysis, because their game-
theoretic models and examples of identity conflicts treat individuals as having but 
one (salient) social identity at a time (Green or Red in their prototype model), so 
that the issue of individuals having multiple social identities does not arise: ‘When 
an individual's identity is associated with multiple social categories, the “situation” 
could determine, for example, which categories are most salient’ (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000, p. 731n). Accordingly, their analysis of individual behaviour in their 
prototype model and its extensions works in terms of losses suffered by the 
individual associated with what they term identity externalities, but ignores possible 
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offsetting gains were individuals to re-rank their social identities (see ibid., pp. 
727–31). This means that their model is quite limited in scope, especially since the 
social psychology literature provides considerable empirical evidence (if not 
complete explanations) that individuals in identity conflicts with others often re-
order their rankings of different social identities rather than simply respond to 
others along the axis of a single social identity. By ignoring this kind of case, 
Akerlof and Kranton thus employ something akin to a partial equilibrium identity 
analysis, which has the virtue for them of effectively preventing the multiple social 
identifications issue and the ‘bearer’ problem from arising within their framework, 
but which means that their analysis has limited practical relevance. 
This strategy might of course be thought a reasonable one, were they to 
identify the bearer of social identities as the individual utility function. The utility 
function is of course the individual's own utility function and, consequently, it might 
be argued, when incorporating social identity as an argument in the utility function, 
that an individual's many social identities must all belong to this self-same 
individual. This argument, however, is unsatisfactory, because the utility function 
cannot provide an account of personal identity. The (implied) argument that it does 
proceeds by explaining personal identity in terms of individual preferences, that is, 
that an individual can be identified in terms of his/her own preferences, because an 
individual's preferences are necessarily his/her own and no one else's. But this 
argument is circular, and presupposes what it is meant to explain, because it 
designates preferences as ‘own’ preferences.9 This means that individuality must be 
taken as exogenous in the neoclassical framework, or that individuals can only be 
taken to be independent of one another by stipulation. While this may suit 
economists' traditional goals of analysis in many standard contexts, the reliance on 
the utility function as the individual's objective function is more problematic for 
Akerlof and Kranton's social identity analysis which, by allowing for multiple social 
identities, needs to provide a more secure account of personal identity if they are to 
expand their game-theoretic behavioural analysis successfully beyond restricted 
and arguably unrealistic partial equilibrium-type examples. That is, without an 
account of personal identity, their framework lacks a representation of the unity of 
the self or the bearer of the individual's many social identities. 
In this regard, the sociological identity approach offers valuable suggestions 
regarding how one might think about personal identity in non-atomistic, interactive 
social contexts. Recall that the central assumption of that approach is that there is 
a reciprocal relation between the self and society in which each influences the 
other. Or, focusing on individuals' side of this relationship, individuals being able to 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be accessed by following the 
link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
 
 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, No. 3 (May 2007): pg. 349-362. DOI. This article is © [Oxford University Press] and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. [Oxford University Press] does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from [Oxford University Press]. 
14 
 
 
influence society reflects their having an ability actively to negotiate their different 
social roles. Bandura and Mischel label this particular active ability self-efficacy, and 
the former explains it as the ability individuals have to ‘organize and execute the 
courses of action required to produce given attainments’ (Bandura, 1997, p. 3). 
This might seem to be essentially what many economists believe is involved in the 
act of choice in utility function analysis, but there are two key differences from that 
analysis. First, Bandura and other proponents of the sociological identity approach 
place emphasis on interpreting the agent as active in the sense of exercising 
abilities—a concept which does not standardly operate in the utility framework. 
Second, and more importantly, for social psychologists ability is always understood 
reflexively as an ability the individual exercises specifically in interactive social 
contexts in taking him/herself as a single object.10 Taking these two points 
together, it is possible to see the outlines of an account of personal identity in the 
sociological approach which would address the multiple social identities problem. 
On the one hand, when individuals in interactive social contexts reflexively take 
themselves to be a single object, they by definition form a conception of 
themselves independent of their multiple social identities. This self-conception then 
constitutes an elementary basis for explaining individuals' personal identities in 
relation to their social identities. On the other hand, that individuals are active in 
exercising this ability suggests that they manage this personal identity conception 
by organising their multiple social identities, perhaps by ranking and re-ranking 
them according to their view of a personal identity life plan worked out in their 
continual interaction with others. They do not, that is, simply find themselves 
locked into ‘situations’ over which they have no control, but actively negotiate these 
‘situations’, and thereby make themselves the ‘bearers’ of their different social 
identities. 
7 Inverting the Akerlof–Kranton framework to add 
personal identity 
Here I suggest an alternative framework meant to capture the sorts of 
considerations advanced in the last section. The Akerlof–Kranton approach makes 
utility depend upon social identity in terms of (1), and then explains how the 
individual ‘produces’ social identity (game-theoretically) in terms of (2). But if, as 
suggested above in connection with the sociological approach, we were to treat the 
individual as being active in creating a personal identity, then we might rather say 
that the individual's objective function is a personal identity production function, 
which we could generate by inverting the Akerlof–Kranton framework to make 
personal identity reflect the ‘utility’ involved in the individual's negotiating his/her 
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multiple social identities. That is, embedding Akerlof and Kranton's (1) and (2) in a 
new individual objective function seen as a personal identity production function 
would give:  
 
Graphic (3) 
 
This new PIj function concerns j's personal identity as opposed to the Ij 
function that concerns j's social identity or self-image. Making PIj a function of the 
individual's ‘utility’, which is itself a function of social identity, would essentially 
then tell us that the individual's production of personal identity involves preferences 
over the ranking and organisation of that individual's multiple social identities 
consistent with the individual sustaining a personal identity. However, these 
preferences would not need to be seen as psychological phenomenon, as in Akerlof 
and Kranton's anxiety or cognitive dissonance reduction model, but could rather be 
explained socially along the lines of the social preferences concept as associated 
with the individual's forms of interaction with and relations to others (Heinrich et 
al., 2004). Further, in addition to representing the individual as an active producer, 
the PIj personal identity production function can be seen to represent the individual 
as reflexive since, just as in standard neoclassical analysis, the individual takes the 
arguments of the utility function as objects, so here the individual takes the revised 
utility function itself as an object. Since Uj constitutes a representation of the 
individual as a subject apart from the objective function itself, we can speak of Uj 
as the subject's object, and then more fully regard PIj as a production objective 
function in which the individual actively constructs a personal identity by reflexively 
engaging with themselves in the form of their Uj evaluation of their multiple social 
identities. 
It should be emphasised, however, that PIj is not a full theory of personal 
identity, because there is little here to explain how and why individuals manage 
their personal identities other than that doing so involves organising their different 
social identities. Nonetheless, the PIj approach seems promising both because it 
makes central to the theory of the individual the idea that the individual works to 
sustain a personal unity in the face of potential fragmentation of the self, and 
because this work specifically concerns the individual's multiple social identities, 
thus squarely placing this view of the individual in the category of what I have 
previously referred to as a socially embedded individual conception (Davis, 2003). 
However, what more is involved in explaining personal identity than this, and 
further how specifically individuals might be thought to manage their different 
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social identities and engage in re-rankings, are questions which are here left 
unaddressed. 
It is also worth noting that treating PIj as the individual's objective function 
does not imply that individuals optimise or maximise personal identity as they 
would in the case of a standard utility function. The reflexive treatment of PIj here 
is not readily conformable to an instrumental rationality framework, since 
instrumental rationality involves a means–ends relationship that typically 
presupposes given ends, while the idea that the individual reflexively takes the 
subject (in the form of Uj) as an object implies that Uj is exposed to some form of 
evaluation and not taken merely as given. Thus, we might consider that PIj 
employs what I have termed an obligation-based deontological rather than 
instrumental rationality if we focus on the manner by which individuals form 
associations with particular social groups. Akerlof and Kranton employ a 
psychological internalisation mechanism in their account of individual attachment to 
groups, and then apply a anxiety/cognitive dissonance minimisation reading to 
provide an instrumentally rational understanding of the utility function. But an 
alternative, distinctly social mechanism that explains how individuals might attach 
themselves to groups exists in philosophers' recent collective intentionality theory 
(e.g., Tuomela, 1995; Searle, 1995). In this theory, when individuals form 
collective intentions in interaction with others, they ‘voluntarily bind’ themselves to 
others through the content of those intentions, and this creates a sense of 
obligation by which they guide their behaviour in groups (Davis, 2003, ch. 7). On 
this view of association with others as social rather than psychological, a 
deontologically rational behaviour underlies the revised Uj function in (3). 
Individuals no doubt still behave in an instrumentally rational way in a variety of 
contexts, but it may well be that instrumental rationality poorly captures their 
behaviour in relation to others, particularly as concerns how they manage their 
different social identities. For the PIj function, then, rationality would need to be 
seen as complex in combining in the individual two different and incommensurable 
types of behaviour. 
8 Akerlof and Kranton and recent economics 
The Akerlof–Kranton paper is an example of ‘recent economics’ understood 
as a set of new research strategies relying on imports from other sciences to 
produce departures from the traditional assumptions of neoclassical economics. 
Some of these departures have been more radical than others, and consequently 
threaten to disrupt that traditional framework. In other cases, new contents appear 
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essentially conformable to neoclassical theorising. And yet, in some cases, what 
may initially appear conformable to standard assumptions turns out to be more 
problematic than anticipated. The Akerlof–Kranton paper involves the insertion of 
non-economics content into economic analysis by means of its addition of a self-
image argument to the utility function, one of the mainstays of the neoclassical 
approach. Thus, on the surface, the paper seems to fall into the second category as 
involving a conformable import. However, I suggest the paper rather falls into the 
third set of cases. Because the social identity approach on which Akerlof and 
Kranton draw was developed in such a way as to preclude methodologically 
individualist forms of explanation, it made social categories as developed by social 
scientists its main vehicle for investigating social identity. This effectively foreclosed 
any analysis of how individuals happened to have particular social identities, or how 
they might organise their different social identities to create personal identities. 
Rather, the method of analysis employed by social identity theorists was to say, 
were a set of individuals to be classified in such-and-such a way, then how would 
their awareness of a particular social identity be likely to manifest ‘accentuation 
effects’, and so lead to such phenomena as stereotyping, ethnocentrism, prejudice 
and in-group bias. Akerlof and Kranton add the utility function as their 
representation of the individual to this analysis, but as that analysis lacks a means 
of explaining how individuals see any particular social identity as salient, their 
introduction of an identity concept into standard economics in conjunction with the 
utility function ends up having an ad hoc quality about it. But this in turn then 
raises questions regarding the representation of the individual in terms of the utility 
function, particularly whether that representation can provide a way of 
understanding personal identity. Given that utility function analysis apparently lacks 
a means of addressing the multiple selves/multiple utility function problem (Davis, 
2003, pp. 63ff.), that Akerlof and Kranton recognise that individuals have multiple 
social identities casts doubt on whether any account of individual identity is 
available in their framework. Thus, an apparently unintended consequence of their 
particular import is to jeopardise the whole neoclassical framework. 
My suggested inversion of their analysis, and reinterpretation of the utility 
function in non-psychological and social terms, meant to offer an alternative 
framework that begins from the assumption that social identity and personal 
identity are linked concepts. I also rely on importing a non-economics science 
contents into economics but, instead of psychology's social identity approach, I 
prefer importing sociology's interactionist view of individuals and society as not only 
more hospitable to a possible account of the linkages between the two identity 
concepts, but as also creating a framework for an account of individuals in 
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economics that would fill the vacuum left by neoclassical thinking now made 
apparent in connection with identity analysis that fails to say how an individual with 
many social identities is still one individual. However, the inversion of the Akerlof–
Kranton analysis suggested here, it should be emphasised, advances a conception 
of the individual that is fundamentally different from their conception in two key 
respects. First, individuals are socially embedded rather than atomistic, in the sense 
that their very individuality is a function of their relations to others. Second, the 
account of rationality of socially embedded individuals is complex, in that it 
combines both deontological and instrumentally rational dimensions. Individuals 
appear to operate with categorically different types of decision logics, and this 
means that, if we are to see them as engaged in producing their personal identities, 
then this activity cannot be explained in terms of optimisation. Thus, from the 
perspective of this particular strategy for rebuilding the account of the individual in 
economics by means of the imports from other science described here, the 
departures from standard analysis are, in large degree, disruptive of that traditional 
framework. 
The author is grateful to the referees of this journal for their insightful and helpful 
comments on a previous version of this paper 
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1Early contributions are Sen (1985), Folbre (1994), Davis (1995). More recent 
attention to identity has come from Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005), 
Barrett (2005), Darity et al. (forthcoming), Davis (2003, 2006), Livet (2004), 
Loury (2002), Kirman and Teschl (2004), Mason (2004) and Sen (1999, 
2004). 
2For a synthetic overview of the social identity approach, see Hogg et al. (1995). 
3For a synthetic overview of the sociological approach to identity, see Stets and 
Burke (2000). 
4The quoted passage is from Thomas' textbook (1996, p. 284). 
6I return to this point in connection with Akerlof and Kranton's adoption of the 
social identity approach below. 
7For further details, see the two surveys cited in fn. 1 and 2. 
8Mead's traditional approach, known as the situational approach, assumes social 
structures are continuously transformed, and thus relatively unstable. 
9The argument dates back in slightly different form to John Locke, and was seen by 
his own commentators and more recently contemporary philosophers to be 
circular. I discuss Locke's argument and the one based on the utility function 
in more detail in Davis (2003, ch. 3). 
10The argument in Davis (2003, pp. 145ff.) is that the reflexive stance individuals 
take in interactive contexts escapes the circularity problem that utility 
function analysis encounters (in regard to individuals knowing their own 
preferences) in virtue of individuals in such contexts taking themselves as 
single objects in light of others doing so. 
 
